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to remedy the problem of self-disconnection among energy prepayment 
consumers. Self-disconnection happens when consumers exhaust all 
available credit in their meter and are left without supply of energy. This 
has serious consequences for the wellbeing of consumers and may 
increase firms’ costs. We design a mechanism composed of a commitment 
contract and a reminder in order to minimize the number of self-
disconnections.  We empirically assess this mechanism by examining (1) 
the determinants of self-disconnection and (2) the choice of different 
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Introduction 
 
Research in economics and psychology suggests that most choices involve intertemporal 
trade-offs between immediate and delayed costs or benefits (Frederick et al. 2002). In order 
to evaluate such trade-offs, decision makers compare the costs and the benefits that occur at 
different times. However, people can be impatient in the sense that they like to enjoy 
immediate rewards and to defer costs (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Strotz (1956) was the 
first to model impatience for near-term trade-offs rather than for future ones, modelling it as a 
commitment device. He showed that under exponential discounting preferences are time 
consistent, but under non-exponential discounting agents may prefer to constrain their own 
choices. 
Self-control plays an important role in explaining inconsistencies for the future over 
time and across activities (Lowenstein 2000). People with high levels of self-control are able 
to stay on diets, exercise regularly, and to lead their lives within their means, whereas those 
that lack self-control end up not achieving their aims (Laibson 1997). In order to constrain 
future choices and to obtain a desired outcome, people impose commitment devices that 
facilitate the achievement of goals (Brocas et al. 2004; Bryan et al. 2010). It has been shown 
that commitment devices are effective in improving performance in school (Ariely and 
Wertenbroch 2002), in saving money (Ashraf et al. 2006; Benartzi and Thaler 2004), in the 
context of addictions (Bernheim and Rangel 2004), etc. 
Prepayment metering is an interesting case to study intertemporal trade-offs. 
Prepayment is a payment method where the payment is made before the actual consumption; 
that is, consumers have to pay for electricity and/or gas (immediate costs) before they 
consume it (delayed benefits). Moreover, consumers must plan in advance their future 
consumption. This planning, or lack of it, may lead to self-disconnection, which happens 
when consumers exhaust all available credit in their meter and are left without supply of 
energy for a certain period.  
Self-disconnection has serious consequences for the wellbeing of consumers, such as 
lack of heating; impacts on food preparation; leisure and psychological impacts, e.g. shame 
or loss of self-esteem (Consumer Focus 2010). Likewise, self-disconnection generates costs 
for the energy suppliers since it may contribute to lower energy consumption, higher debt 
levels, and higher costs related to reconnection of energy supply.  
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The aim of this paper is to propose a mechanism that minimizes the number of self-
disconnections through commitment and awareness. This paper has implications not only for 
the more efficient use of prepayment in energy, but has also implications for poverty. In fact, 
self-disconnection is especially pronounced among low-income households and has been 
linked to fuel poverty (Brutscher 2012b; O’Sullivan 2013). Fuel poverty is usually defined as 
the inability to keep an adequate level of warmth on 10% of household income and has been 
regarded as a likely contributor to increased winter mortality rates (O’Sullivan et al. 2013). If 
we find a mechanism that minimizes the number of self-disconnections, then we can 
contribute to a better energy comfort for those households who fall in the category of fuel 
poor, reducing the negative consequences of fuel poverty. 
First, we design a mechanism that induces higher rates of savings committed to 
energy consumption and that decreases the likelihood of consumers to self-disconnect. 
Consumers differ in their degree of self-control and in their willingness to accept a 
commitment device. The energy supply firm does not know the different degrees of self-
control amongst consumers and so needs to target consumers effectively. The mechanism is 
composed of a commitment contract and an energy consumption reminder in order to account 
for the heterogeneity of consumers and their private information. We propose a commitment 
contract for consumers who lack self-control but their awareness makes them sophisticated 
enough to engage in such a contract, and a feedback/reminder to those consumers who are 
not aware of their lack of self-control.  
Second, we empirically examine the determinants of self-disconnection and the 
choice of different commitment contracts using data from a representative survey that we 
have designed for this purpose. The survey was applied to a subset of British Gas customers 
who use a gas prepayment meter. British Gas is one of the largest retailers in the UK, 
providing service to approximately 15.9 million energy households.  
We find that self-control problems play a role in self-disconnection. We are able to 
identify those consumers who would benefit from a commitment contract. Moreover, we 
show that there is a demand for commitment and saving opportunities among consumers. 
These findings demonstrate that there is a scope to introduce a commitment contract. The 
prepayment meter can be used as a flexible self-commitment device and in fact a significant 
share of consumers use the prepayment meter as a device to control energy expenses. 
However, prepayment meters alone cannot prevent self-disconnection completely. This 
emphasizes the need for a commitment contract that increases the control over energy 
expenses. Overall, we show that there is an interest over the different commitment saving 
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contracts, and that a significant share of consumers would prefer to smooth their energy 
expenditures if a commitment contract enabled them to do so.  
 
1. Background on prepayment energy 
 
Prepayment consumers insert credit into their meters by the use of a key or card that is then 
used or spent when electricity or gas is consumed in the home. This allows the consumer to 
decide the amount of energy to be consumed beforehand, as happens commonly with mobile 
phone services.  
Prepayment meters (PPMs) emerged as a mean of offering indebted domestic 
consumers the ability to pay their energy bills. Countries such as UK, South Africa, 
Mozambique, Canada, Australia, among others, offer this type of payment in the “energy 
sector”. In UK, the number of PPM consumers increased, by 2012, to around 4.2 million 
household electricity consumers (15.5% of the total) and 3 million household gas consumers 
(13.3% of the total) (Ofgem 2012).  
One important feature of PPMs is that, when the credit is exhausted, the supply of 
energy can be interrupted. In a stricter definition, self-disconnection happens when the 
consumer has exhausted all the available credit, including the emergency credit. The 
emergency credit is a fixed value (usually £5 in UK) of gas or electricity that is made 
available, at no extra cost, when consumers run out of credit and was created to overcome 
self-disconnection. However, other alternatives are also offered. One example is friendly 
credit – certain periods over the day in which suppliers do not disconnect whatever the 
consumer’s usage or credit status. These options give more time for consumers to top up their 
card.  
Different reasons have been given in order to explain self-rationing and self-
disconnection: inconvenience/transport costs, forgetting to top up, financial constraints or 
coordination issues (Brutscher 2012b; O’Sullivan et al. 2013; Consumer Focus 2010). In 
situations in which the reasons are a lack of opportunity to go to an outlet; forgetting to top 
up; or coordination issues within the household - options like emergency credit or friendly 
credit are good solutions. Conversely, if we consider financial constraints, identified by 
Brutscher (2012b) as the main driver of self-disconnection, such solutions may just postpone 
the problem rather than fix it. On the one hand, it can provide more credit flexibility by 
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providing additional help for those who do not have money available, but on the other hand, 
it does not help consumers with more severe problems and/or who lack of self-control.  
Self-disconnection implies that households opt to have discrete jumps in energy 
consumption rather than smoothing consumption throughout the year. Brutscher (2012b) 
analyses this puzzle and argues that a possible explanation is preference reversals (usually 
associated with self-control problems) that end up affecting consumers’ ability to save. In the 
UK, self-disconnection happens mostly during the autumn/winter for gas consumption since 
energy expenditure tends to be greater than in the spring/summer due to heating. During the 
winter, consumers might realize that they need to save in order to avoid self-disconnection, 
but as soon as the summer arrives they have a different set of preferences. Those households 
who exhibit impatience during the summer can fail to have the sufficient liquidity to purchase 
enough credit during the winter, which affects their tendency to self-disconnect. 
Building on Brutscher’s (2012b) findings, we propose a mechanism composed of a 
commitment contract and a reminder to induce higher rates of savings and consequently, 
decrease the likelihood of self-disconnection.  
 
2. A mechanism to minimize self-disconnection 
 
We start by analysing the type of consumers that we need to target in order to reduce self-
disconnections. In the literature on self-control there is a major distinction between 
“sophisticated” and “naïve” agents. “Sophisticated” agents are aware of their lack of future 
self-control whereas “naïve” agents are unaware (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2001)2. 
Agents unaware of their self-control problems will repeatedly procrastinate believing that 
they will act tomorrow. This heterogeneity among agents complicates the incentive design 
since optimal incentives differ for different types of agents. “Sophisticated” agents will easily 
accept a commitment contract. “Naïve” agents are less likely to accept an energy 
commitment contract since they have incorrect perceptions about future behaviour. As 
Brutscher (2012a) points out household energy, like all household expenditure, may involve 
complicated family dynamics where the presence of a commitment device may allow a 
“sophisticated” agent within the family to prevent a “naïve” agent from acting inconsistently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) and Laibson (1997) analyse the existence of cognitive behavioural issues that lead for 
a need of a commitment device through a (quasi)-hyperbolic model. Other important works are based on temptation (Gul 
and Pesendorfer 2001), dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine 2006) and limited attention (Karlan et al. 2010).  
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with family resources, e.g. a husband spending money on summer time other than allowing 
the wife to save for winter fuel. A firm serving a mixed group of agents (consumers) does not 
usually know the degree of self-control of the individual consumers and so it needs to offer a 
different type of incentive for the naïve. In order to induce these consumers to accept a 
commitment contract or at least to increase their level of awareness, we propose an energy 
consumption reminder.  
Overall, the consumers that we wish to target (1) are more likely to have self-control 
issues as opposed to consumers that do not act inconsistently; (2) can afford the spare cash 
required in order to increase their savings; and (3) have higher personal self-disconnection or 
self-rationing costs than benefits, i.e. they, together with the firm, should benefit from 
minimizing self-disconnection.  
 
2.1.  Commitment contract 
 
The ideal commitment contract to offer to energy consumers would be one that provides 
maximal consumption smoothing. However, there are challenges when developing a contract 
that involves a commitment product.  
First, one needs to consider the trade-off between commitment and flexibility. As 
pointed out in Ashraf et al. (2003), individuals demand highly liquid saving devices but they 
also need a certain degree of commitment. Thus, there is a trade-off between flexibility and 
commitment that will vary according to the customer’s self-control.  
Second, we need to consider whether there is a concern about exploitation of 
consumers. From a consumer perspective, if a household accepts the commitment contract 
offered by a firm then it is because it will benefit from it, otherwise it would not accept it. 
Interestingly, in the present case, a commitment contract, if successful, can decrease costs 
associated with self-disconnection for the consumers (in terms of energy discomfort) and the 
firm (in terms of the costs of dealing with disconnection/debt collection). 
Based on these concerns, we propose four types of commitment contracts that can 
work in the context of prepayment energy. As in Beshears et al. (2011), we consider different 
contracts with different degrees of flexibility and saving targets (see Table 1). The essence of 
these contracts is straightforward: households commit to allocate a portion of each top-up 
into savings to use in future energy expenditure. In the contracts’ design, we have assumed 
two periods: period 0 corresponds to the spring/summer where the commitment is made, and 
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period 1 corresponds to the autumn/winter where self-disconnection is reduced. The contracts 
here proposed are the following ones.  
Regular payments throughout year: Based on a summary of the previous year’s 
consumption, the customer agrees to an equal weekly/monthly amount and commits to a 
payment schedule through the year. This contract implies a significant loss of flexibility. 
Voluntary savings target: The customer chooses a target amount that they feel 
comfortable/confident about saving. The customer is responsible for meeting this target and it 
is up to them whether it is achieved each month. The credit saved can be used to offset winter 
consumption. The customer is free to choose how much to save in each week, but postponing 
savings is allowed. 
Ad-hoc extra payments: The customer makes additional payments as and when they 
can afford to do so. The customer would not have to nominate a target for savings, but the 
more that is saved the more winter consumption would be offset. This is the plan that offers 
the most flexibility of all commitment contracts, although it is not a real commitment, only an 
awareness device. 
Summer fixed extra payments: The customer commits to additional fixed payments 
just during summer months.  These additional payments could be calculated on the basis of 
wintertime gas consumption in the previous year, not necessarily equal payments throughout 
the year. The extra payments would be used to cover higher gas payments in the wintertime.  
Table 1 shows the main differences in terms of flexibility and saving target for the 
four types of commitment contract. Flexibility is either low or medium because in all 
contracts, the consumer has to insert extra credit in the meter that can only be used for gas or 
electricity expenses. This is in contrast with the energy consumption reminder that, as we will 
discuss in the next section, has a high degree of flexibility and no-predefined saving target.  
 
Table 1. Main features of the commitment contracts 
 Regular payments 
throughout year 
Voluntary savings 
target 
Ad-hoc extra 
payments 
Summer fixed 
extra payments 
Flexibility Low Medium Medium Low 
Saving target Yes (set by the firm) Yes (set by the 
consumer) 
No Yes (set by the 
consumer) 
 
In order to avoid attrition, the following restriction could be imposed: “Savings can 
only be consumed in the following period”. This can be done, if feasible in both technical and 
regulatory terms, through a second card used to insert and lock the savings or via an online 
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“commitment store”, e.g. stickk.com. If consumers need to withdraw their savings, then they 
need to contact the firm. By creating more transaction costs, consumers have the incentives to 
break the commitment only for reasons such as unexpected shocks as opposed to 
procrastination or impulse/temptation. 
It could be that fixing an amount of credit in the prepayment card is not possible for 
technical reasons or simply not allowed by the authorities. In this case, one can minimize the 
number of withdrawals before time through a reward/incentive. Actually, in some of the 
proposed contracts, a minimum saving requirement is explicitly assumed. In order to 
emphasize the importance of such a requirement, a reward to save can be introduced. In the 
beginning of period 0, the consumer chooses a “fixed” goal amount of savings to accumulate 
during period 0. If, at the beginning of period 1, the goal has been reached, then the reward is 
given.  
We can also impose, if necessary, a further requirement: no self-disconnection. This 
can be achieved through the use of a reward that is offered to the customer if they do not self-
disconnect during the winter.  
 Note that these rewards should not be very high/attractive for three reasons. First, 
consumers may just accept because the effective price of energy has been changed, rather 
than because of a “behavioural” change. Second, we want to ensure that those consumers 
whose costs (in terms of energy discomfort) are higher than the benefits of self-disconnection 
(in terms of extra money saved from not consuming energy during a certain period) are 
targeted to receive the commitment contract. Third, the reward implies costs to the firm that 
should not be exceeded by the benefits associated with the lower number of self-
disconnections, otherwise the firm will not have an incentive to offer a commitment contract.  
A further concern that may arise regards competition issues and lock-in effects (i.e. 
when the firm makes it extremely hard for the customers to leave them). Given that the 
consumers are free to choose their type of contract, if the firm continues offering the 
conventional prepayment method (among others), then the consumers are always free to 
switch type of contract, besides being able to switch firm.  
 
2.2. Reminder/Feedback on consumption 
 
We suggest a reminder or feedback in order to attract consumers who do not accept a 
commitment contract due to their self-control unawareness. The idea is that the energy supply 
firm would increase consumers’ awareness regarding the need to top up regularly.  
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So far, we have assumed that self-disconnection is associated with an incomplete task, 
where this task is the accumulation of savings for future energy expenditure. A commitment 
device is used to increase the chances of successfully completing the task. However, perhaps 
the problem is that, in certain periods, consumers forget that their energy expenditure in the 
winter is greater than in the summer, which, leads to over consumption or under saving. Then 
when winter arrives, the consumer faces the second-best option of reducing energy 
consumption. It may also be that consumers do not recognize their future expenditure 
because they do not value heating as much as their future self does and so they assume that 
energy expenditure will be roughly the same. Consequently, a further explanation for self-
disconnection is that consumers may suffer from limited attention/memory.   
A reminder can be effective because time inconsistency, under this argument, is 
derived from a failure to forecast future expenditure leading to less consumption smoothing 
than would occur under perfect foresight (Karlan et al. 2010). A reminder/feedback implies 
voluntary and selective attention from the consumer given that they want to save for future 
energy consumption.  
In the prepayment energy context, a reminder on consumption could be as follows: 
“Last year you spent £20 on gas between July and September and you spent £120 on gas 
between October and December”. The reminder/feedback can be extended by introducing a 
saving cue, e.g. “By saving extra £50 during the summer time, you can smooth your gas 
expenses throughout the year”. The reminder could be sent by e-mail or mobile SMS during 
period 0. Interestingly, if the consumer does not wish to consume more energy during the 
winter, then self-rationing is not driven by reasons of dynamic inconsistency or by limited 
attention issues. The consumers who choose rationally to self-ration are those that we do not 
need to target since their benefits from self-rationing and self-disconnecting are greater than 
their costs. We want to target those customers whose costs exceed benefits because they are 
the ones who will benefit from a commitment contract. 
 
3. Data 
 
The data source used for examining the mechanism is from a survey developed in 
collaboration with British Gas designed specifically for prepayment gas customers. The 
survey was available online between January and February 2013 and was sent via email to 
20,000 customers (11% of surveys were undelivered). Surveys with a significant small 
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number of responses were dropped from the database. In total and for estimation purposes, 
we obtained 1541 usable responses.  
The survey, designed to be representative of the prepayment consumers and fielded 
accordingly, included a series of detailed questions about the respondent’s saving plan choice 
and demographics (age, gender, education, household size, and income). A wide range of 
questions to assess self-disconnection, saving behaviour, topping-up behaviour, opinions 
about the prepayment meter3, and questions to measure self-control were also included. For a 
summary of the main variables employed in the paper see appendix, Table A1.  
Regarding the questions on the preferences about the saving plan, we did not ask 
open-ended questions (e.g. “Do you want to make more spread and similar payments 
throughout the year?”). Instead, we gave a specific text for each of the saving plans, similar 
to the contracts’ description in section 2.1 and asked the respondents which of the plans they 
would prefer (see Appendix for the questions related to the saving plan choice). This type of 
questions is usually referred to as “stated preference questions”4, and will allow us to use the 
“stated preference” questionnaire techniques described in Louviere et al. (2000). 
Nevertheless, these questions may involve some limitations: respondents may find some 
trade-offs difficult to evaluate because they are unfamiliar with the suggested saving plans; 
and once the number of attributes increases, the complexity and the number of comparisons 
increase, which may lead to a loss of interest from the respondent. For these reasons we took 
great care in explaining the different plans in detail and focus on differences in attribute 
levels. The attribute levels (i.e. level of flexibility and saving target) for the commitment 
contracts are presented in Table 1. The reminder/feedback has the following attribute levels: 
high level of flexibility and no saving target. We included in the survey one extra alternative 
(“none of the options”) that we use as our main reference choice, which is valid as a constant 
for all respondents given that they were all using the same payment method at the moment of 
the survey and acts as a status quo alternative. The absence of a status quo alternative would 
bias interest in saving options upwards. 
 
Socio-Economic Variables. Table 2 compares the age and gender of the respondents of the 
survey with the group of customers who have a contract with British Gas for the supply of 
gas through a prepayment meter. Our sample is representative with small differences in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although, we have asked questions to assess their opinions over prepayment meter, we did not use them for the empirical 
analysis. 
4 Or using a more recent terminology “discrete choice experiments” questions (Carson and Louviere, 2011),	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number of customers aged between 22 and 34 years old and between 45 and 54 years old.  
  
Table 2: Survey sample: control variables 
 
Category 
 
Survey sample 
(%) 
PPM Gas in British Gas 
(%) 
Gender Male 37.8 39.4 
 
Female 62.2 59.4 
Age 21 and Under 0.2 2.2 
 
22 to 34 5.6 25.9 
 
35 to 44 20.7 24.4 
 
45 to 54 38.5 24.7 
 
55 to 64 25 13.8 
 65 and Over 9.9 9.1 
 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables. The 
consumers in the sample are, on average, between 45 and 54 years old, with basic and 
medium levels of education (around 31% and 34% respectively) and lower and medium 
levels of household income (approximately 33% and 33% respectively). The household is 
composed, on average, of two adults and one child. All variables are categorical except for 
the members of adults and children in the household. Information about household income 
and education are captured by a group of dichotomous variables, where the reference 
variables for each group are low income and no education.  We now turn to a discussion of 
the main variables of interest. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: demographic characteristics 
Measures Total Male Female 
Income levels 
      Low income (up to £1000) .414 (.493) .405 (.491) .419 (.494) 
Medium income (£1001 to £2000) .406 (.491) .393 (.489) .415 (.493) 
High income (over £2000) .166 (.373) .187 (.391) .153 (.361) 
Education levels 
      None  .133 (.340) .158 (.365) .119 (.323) 
Basic (O-levels) .346 (.476) .280 (.449) .386 (.487) 
Medium (A-levels + Technical education) .377 (.485) .406 (.491) .360 (.480) 
Higher (Undergraduate + Postgraduate 
degrees) 
.166 (.373) .156 (.363) .136 (.343) 
#Adults in the household 2.19 (1.05) 2.14 (1.08) 2.21 (1.04) 
#Children in the household .924 (1.11) .636 (.989) 1.07 (1.14) 
Observations 1541 583 958 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Monthly household income includes any benefits. Low income 
and no education will be used as benchmark categorical variables. 
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Self-disconnection and Emergency Credit. Table 4 shows our measures of self-
disconnection and emergency credit. At least 62% of the sample stated that had already used 
the emergency credit and around 37% had already self-disconnected at some point.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of emergency credit and self-disconnection 
Answer Freq. Percent. Cum. 
Emergency Credit (stated), redefined1 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I rarely use the 
emergency credit. 
(0) Strongly agree, agree 550 38.38 38.38 
(1) Strongly disagree, disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree 883 61.62 100 
Total 1,433 100   
Self-disconnection (stated), redefined 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Sometimes the 
emergency credit runs out. 
(0) Strongly disagree, disagree 828 60.61 60.61 
(1) Strongly agree, agree, neither 
agree nor disagree 538 36.77 100 
Total 1,366 100   
Notes: 1 The variables are redefined since the original ones are in a scale from “Strongly 
agree” to “Strongly disagree”, including a “Don’t know” option that was dropped in the 
redefined variables.  
 
Inconvenience of Top-up. A possible explanation for a household using the emergency 
credit or self-disconnecting is that it is inconvenient to top-up, for example due to transaction 
costs. Every time consumers need to top-up, they have to go to an outlet or if the payment 
can be made through an online account, the consumers still need to have access to internet. 
Other reasons may include liquidity constraints or lack of income. In order to take into 
account this factor we have asked the respondents to answer, on a scale from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree” including a “don’t know” option, the sentence “Pay As You Go 
makes it easy to pay for my gas”. From this we constructed the binary variable inconvenience 
of top up that is zero if the customer had answered “strongly agree” or “agree” to the question 
or one otherwise. In all redefined variables throughout the analysis, the “don’t know” option 
was dropped. Interestingly, the majority of the respondents have stated that a prepayment 
meter does make it easy to pay for gas (see Table A2 for a cross-tabulation with self-
disconnection).  
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Topping Up Behaviour. The consumers were asked to state whether they top up more over 
the winter or roughly the same over the year. This is summarized in the variable top up all 
year that equals to one if consumer i tops up roughly the same all year around and zero if 
consumer i tops up much more over the winter. The majority of the consumers choose to top 
up according to their needs, and so their top-ups were more frequent over the winter. From 
the consumers who top up roughly the same all year round, only 29% had self-disconnected; 
whereas 40% of those who top up more during the winter had already self-disconnected (see 
Table A3 in the Appendix). Although consumers who self impose a personal rule or internal 
commitment mechanism, such as topping up the same every week, are less exposed to self-
disconnection, there are still consumers that top up regularly and self-disconnect. This 
suggests that current regular top-up behaviour is not sufficient in preventing self-
disconnection.  
 
Saving Behaviour. Consumers may have not been using the meter as a commitment device 
via regular top-ups, but still saved for the increase in energy spending. One question asked, 
on a scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, was “When I’m using less gas in 
warmer months I like to add any spare cash to my savings”. 24% of the consumers that 
answered this question, answered “strongly agree” or “agree” against 76% who answered 
“strongly disagree” or “disagree” or “neither agree nor disagree”. This is a redefined variable: 
saving behaviour equals one if the customer answered “strongly agree” or “agree” and zero 
otherwise. Moreover, the relationship between saving behaviour and self-disconnection is not 
statistically significant (see Table A4). This suggests that consumers use the accumulated 
savings during the summer for expenses other than energy.  
 
Spare Cash. Self-disconnection is associated with poverty. Following Bryan et al. (2010), 
behavioural anomalies significantly affect consumers with less disposable income. At this 
point, a relevant question is: do low-income consumers who self-disconnect have the 
opportunity to accumulate savings during the summer? When answering the question “I have 
spare cash in warmer months as I don’t have to spend so much on gas”, 20% of the 
consumers who have answered “strongly agree” or “agree” are in the low-income category 
(see Table A5). Eight percent out of those 20% had already self-disconnected. Consequently, 
a proportion of low-income consumers affected by self-disconnection also had opportunities 
to use a commitment contract. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) argue that low-income 
people consume relatively more temptation goods. Temptation and self-control problems 
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affect both the rich and the poor though they influence and/or matter more for the poor. 
Therefore, through the decrease of temptation and increase in self-control, one may induce 
greater savings.  
 
Self-control. We constructed a measure to assess the level of goal achievement of the 
individuals as a proxy for self-control. Psychologists have considered the impact of 
conscientiousness on self-control and goal achievement can be seen as one facet of 
conscientious trait (see the literature on the Big Five personality traits, e.g. Costa and Widiger 
1994). We decided to focus on goal achievement since it is the most relevant facet of 
conscientious trait in explaining self-control in the context of self-disconnection. Due to the 
limit number of questions in the survey, we have a single question to assess goal achievement 
and thus, our question does not assess completely goal achievement but rather focuses on 
goal task, planning and procrastination issues.  
 
Which of the following statements best describe you? (Choose two responses at most.) 
 (a) I usually achieve my goals. 
 (b) I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking. 
 (c) I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization. 
 (d) I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve. 
 (e) I don’t usually achieve my goals. 
 
In order to construct an index for “goal achievement” from this question, we 
delineated three different levels: high, medium, and low goal achievement (see Table A6 in 
the Appendix for a better understanding of these variables). Individuals who usually achieve 
their goals (answered point a) have a high level of goal achievement. In contrast, individuals 
who usually do not achieve their goals (e) are seen as having a low level of goal achievement. 
The intermediate concept targets those individuals who have difficulties in achieving their 
goals (b, c and d). The majority of the respondents, 63%, answered one option only. 
However, respondents could select two options, and so we need to define a rule to divide the 
answers between the three subsets (high, medium and low). Those that have answered 
options (a) and (d) are considered as high because (d) is stronger in terms of goal 
achievement than (b) or (c), whereas those that have answered (a) and (b) or (a) and (c) are 
considered as medium. These answers represent so far 90% of the total answers for this 
question. The remaining answers that have included (e) are considered as low type. Overall, 
the majority of the respondents (around 60%) are considered as high goal achievement types 
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against 10% of the sample that were considered as low goal achievement and 30% as medium 
goal achievement. 
This index has a major limitation for firms and/or decision makers since information 
on attitudes, personality traits and/or behaviour is generally not available. In order to better 
understand how the information on goal achievement correlates with other easily observable 
variables, we conducted a correlation analysis (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Correlations between variables characterizing individual heterogeneity 
      Notes: ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively; GA stands for goal achievement. 
 
Interestingly, education is related only to the extremes with the other variables. There 
is a negative correlation between basic education and high goal achievement and a negative 
correlation between high education and low goal achievement. Additionally, high goal 
achievement is significant negatively correlated with low income and female. The former 
result deserves special attention because those consumers that have low goal achievement 
levels and are low-income are precisely those consumers that can take advantage of a 
commitment contract. The latter correlation is more ambiguous since it might be explained 
either because female respondents in our sample have lower levels of goal achievement when 
compared to male respondents or because female reported goal achievement in a less 
confident manner. Nevertheless, the magnitude of correlation is quite small, around 9%.  
Further, we find that self-disconnection is significant negatively correlated with a high 
goal achievement. This is relevant in light of the discussion above that self-disconnection is 
affected by cognitive biases. In fact, this finding seems to clearly identify those consumers 
who do not need a commitment contract or a reminder, thus our non-target group of 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Household size 1            
2. Female .12*** 1           
3. Low income -.29*** .01 1          
4. Medium income .16*** .02 -.71*** 1         
5. High income .16*** -.04 -.38*** -.37*** 1        
6. Basic education .07* .11*** .00 -.02 .03 1 	   	   	   	   	   	  7. Medium educ. -.06 -.05* -.04 .07** -.03 -.57*** 1 	   	   	   	   	  8. High education .03 -.03 -.09*** .02 .09*** -.30*** -.32*** 1 	   	   	   	  9. Low GA -.06 -.04 .03 -.02 -.03 .02 -.01 -.06** 1 	   	   	  10. Medium GA -.06 .12*** .06* -.02 -.04 .04 -.03 -.01 -.22*** 1 	   	  11. High GA .09** -.09*** -.07** .03 .06* -.05* .04 .04 -.41*** -.80*** 1 	  12. Self-disc. .10*** .03 -.00 .02 -.03 .01 .03 -.02 .01 .12*** -.12*** 1 
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consumers. We also find a positive and statistically significant relationship between self-
disconnection and medium goal achievement. Given this positive correlation, it cannot be 
said that these consumers are truly consistent and one can say that there is a sign that these 
consumers lack self-control. But the question is, will these consumers accept a commitment 
contract? Are they sophisticated enough to be aware of their lack of self-control? We have 
introduced a question in the survey that we will use to inspect this point in the next section: 
“To what extent do you agree with the following statement, on a scale from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree: I get worried about running out of credit”. In fact, 52% of those that have 
answered “strongly agree” or “agree” in this question and have been considered as medium 
goal achievement, have already self-disconnected. 
A further relevant question is: assuming that those respondents with medium goal 
achievement levels are a good proxy for those consumers that would accept a commitment 
contract, how could a firm identify them without the availability of information on self-
control? Table A7 in the Appendix shows the mean characteristics of those respondents that 
were indexed as medium goal achievement. These respondents are more likely to be between 
34 and 54 years old, to have low and medium levels of income, to have basic and medium 
education and top-up more during the winter.  
 
Saving Plans. Table 6 shows the distribution of the choices that consumers made with regard 
to the commitment contracts that were introduced in the previous section and the reminder. 
Interestingly, when asked to choose between the different commitment contracts, the 
reminder or none, 36% of the consumers have chosen the regular payments throughout the 
year, followed by almost 15% choosing the reminder option whereas the voluntary savings 
received least interest.   
 
Table 6. Distribution of the different plans 
Preferred saving plan Freq. Percent Cum. 
Regular payments 457 36.44 36.44 
Voluntary savings 106 8.45 44.9 
Ad-hoc payments 131 10.45 55.34 
Summer fixed payments 47 3.75 59.09 
Reminder 187 14.91 74 
None of the above 326 26 100 
Total 1,254 100   
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4. Estimation Strategy 
 
First, our survey is designed to identify the type of consumers that would accept a 
commitment contract and/or a reminder. In order to increase consumer surplus, we need to 
target those consumers who actually need a commitment contract because, even though their 
costs of self-disconnection exceed the benefits, self-control issues constrain their ability to 
make a strictly rational choice predisposing them to relatively costly self-disconnection. For 
that purpose, we need to understand what are the determinants of self-disconnection. Second, 
we wish to know whether our proposed commitment contracts would be accepted by energy 
consumers and, if so, which contract they would prefer.  
 
Testing for self-control problems in self-disconnection and in emergency credit. We 
analyse the determinants of stated self-disconnection, 𝑆𝐷!, and stated emergency credit, 𝐸𝐶!, 
through a probit estimation of the following equations:  
 
 𝑆𝐷! = 𝛼! + 𝜶!𝒙!! + 𝜶!𝒙!! + 𝛼!𝐺𝐴𝑙! + 𝛼!𝐺𝐴𝑚! + 𝜂! (1) 
 𝐸𝐶! = 𝛾! + 𝜸!𝒙!! + 𝜸!𝒙!! + 𝛾!𝐺𝐴𝑙! + 𝛾!𝐺𝐴𝑚! + 𝜁! (2) 
 
where 𝒙!!  represents a vector of demographic and economic characteristics and 𝒙!! 
represents a vector of variables that may help explaining self-disconnection. In the latter 
vector, we have included top up all year, saving behaviour, and inconvenience of top up. To 
measure self-control, we use our levels of goal achievement as dummy variables and use high 
goal achievement as a reference category in our estimations: 𝐺𝐴𝑙!=1 if low goal achievement 
and zero otherwise; 𝐺𝐴𝑚! = 1   if medium goal achievement and zero otherwise; and 𝐺𝐴ℎ! = 1  if high goal achievement and zero otherwise. 
 
Can we identify “sophisticated” and/or “naïve” consumers? A possible indication of this 
identification of types is to see whether consumers that have a low and/or medium levels of 
goal achievement are more likely to worry about running out of gas than the consumers with 
high goal achievement. A consumer can be worried about running out of credit for several 
reasons, but an interesting one is that they may already self-ration or even self-disconnect, 
and they are aware of their self-control issues. Thus, we expect that a “sophisticated” 
consumer is more likely to be worried about running out of gas, whereas the “naïve” is 
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overconfident. We can use the dummy variable worried, that equals one if consumer i has 
“agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I get worried about running out of credit”, 
and zero otherwise. We use this dummy as a binary dependent variable in the following 
equation.  
 
 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑! = 𝛽! + 𝜷!𝒙!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝐴𝑙! + 𝛽!𝐺𝐴𝑚! + 𝜀! (3) 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimated a probit model where worried is the 
dependent variable; as explanatory variables we included a vector of demographic, including 
gender and economic variables, and a measure of self-control. 𝜀! is a stochastic disturbance. 
 
Preferred Saving Plan. In the second step of our analysis we show a theoretical framework 
for consumers choosing a certain commitment device. A consumer i is faced with a choice 
between the following alternatives or plans: (1) regular payments throughout year, (2) 
voluntary savings target, (3) ad-hoc extra payments, (4) summer fixed extra payments, (5) 
reminder, (6) none of the options.  
Following the additive random utility model for multiple alternatives (see Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005), the individual utility associated with the jth choice can be represented as  
 
 𝑈!" = 𝒙𝒊𝜷! + 𝜀!" , 𝑗 = 1,… ,6	   (4) 
 
where 𝑈!" represents the utility of consumer i of a plan j. 𝜀!" is the random component of 
utility that stands for the consumers unobserved characteristics. 𝜷! are the parameters of the 
model. 
Each consumer decision is based on choosing the plan that offers the highest utility 
level. A certain consumer i chooses plan j if the utility derived from it is higher than the 
utility that he had derived from choosing “none of the options” and from all other plans, 𝑈!" ≥ 𝑈!", for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑠. The choice s, “none of the options”, is used as the reference choice. 
Then, the probability for customer i to choose plan j is given by  
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  Pr 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛! = 𝑗 = Pr 𝑈!" ≥ 𝑈!",∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑠 =                       = Pr 𝒙!𝜷! + 𝜀!" ≥ 𝒙!𝜷! + 𝜀!",∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑠 =                 = Pr 𝒙!𝜷! − 𝒙!𝜷! ≥ 𝜀!" − 𝜀!" ,∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑠  (5) 
 
We assume that the errors 𝜀!" are iid type 1 extreme value, with density 𝑓 𝜀!" =𝑒!!!" exp −𝑒!!!" , 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 6. This results in the multinomial logit Pr 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛! =𝑗 = !𝒙!𝜷!!𝒙!𝜷!!!!!  . The model then takes the following form: 
 
 
𝑃!" = Pr 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛! = 𝑗      = 𝐹(𝛽!! + 𝜷!!𝒙!! + 𝜷!!𝒙!! + 𝛽!!𝑆𝐷! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐴𝑙! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐴𝑚! + 𝜀!") (6) 
 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛!  represents a customer decision about plan j. As before, 𝒙!! 
represents a vector of demographic and economic characteristics and 𝒙!! includes 
inconvenience of top up and saving behaviour. This is estimated using a multinomial logit. 
By estimating equation (6) using a multinomial logit model, we examine the direct impact of 
self-disconnection, goal achievement, inconvenience of top up, saving behaviour and 
individual socioeconomic characteristics on the probability of choosing between one of the 
commitment contracts, or the reminder against the reference category of not choosing any of 
the listed options.  
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Self-disconnection and Emergency Credit 
 
Estimation results for emergency credit and self-disconnection are obtained by estimating 
equations (1) and (2). Table 7 reports the average marginal effects for these equations 
controlling for self-control (models IV and II) and without controlling for self-control 
(models III and I).  
Although income is significant in the emergency credit models, i.e. a lower income 
level increases the probability of using emergency credit; the same does not applied in the 
self-disconnection model. Education does not seem to affect the use of emergency credit or 
the tendency to self-disconnect. The inconvenience of top-up increases the predicted 
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probability to self-disconnect by around 17% holding all other variables at their means 
(model III); whereas top up all year decreases the predicted probability of using the 
emergency credit and of self-disconnection by around 16%5 (model I). A regular top up 
seems to be effective in reducing self-disconnection, however, as discussed in the previous 
sections, it does not completely offset it. Saving behaviour (i.e. being more prone to save) 
affects significantly and negatively the use of emergency credit but is not significantly 
associated with self-disconnection. This emphasizes the finding in the previous section that 
self-imposing a commitment mechanism such as saving during warmer months is not 
sufficient in minimizing self-disconnection.  
 
Result 1.  A self-commitment device such as saving during warmer months is not sufficient in 
minimizing self-disconnection.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Notice that these are categorical variables and so the average marginal effects show how the probability of stated self-
disconnection and stated emergency credit change as the categorical variable, e.g. inconvenience of top-up, changes from 0 
to 1, holding all other variables at their means.  
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Table 7. Probit estimation for emergency credit and for self-disconnection 
Average Marginal 
Effects, Probit 
Dep. Var.: Emergency credit 
Dep. Var.:  
Self-disconnection 
 I II III IV 
Age 
 
 
 
 
  35 to 44  .038 .043 -.114 -.078 
 (.222) (.230) (.225) (.229) 
  45 to 54 -.017 -.000 -.093 -.070 
 (.211) (.219) (.216) (.220) 
  55 to 64 -.007 -.054 -.107 -.063 
 (.220) (.229) (.224) (.229) 
  Over 65 -.152 -.122 -.206** -.155 
 (.253) (.262) (.266) (.274) 
Female -.038 -.021 .002 .009 
 (.094) (.099) (.096) (.101) 
Education 
 
 
 
 
  Medium .042 .050 .016 .025 
 (.096) (.100) (.097) (.101) 
  Higher .014 .002 .018 .017 
 (.133) (.136) (.136) (.140) 
Income 
 
 
 
 
  Medium .105*** .131*** -.007 -.001 
 (.098) (.102) (.099) (.103) 
  High .041 .078 -.043 -.034 
 (.129) (.135) (.131) (.137) 
Household adults  .033** .030* .026 .028 
 (.043) (.045) (.043) (.045) 
Saving behavior -.139*** -.143*** .018 .012 
 (.103) (.109) (.105) (.110) 
Top up all year -.160*** -.183*** -.159*** -.166*** 
 (.149) (.155) (.158) (.164) 
Inconvenience of top up .036 .030 .171*** .164*** 
 (.095) (.099) (.095) (.099) 
Goal Achievement     
  Low  .062  .100* 
  (.155)  (.154) 
  Medium  .053  .122*** 
  (.104)  (.103) 
Constant .182a .057a -.248a -.493a 
 (.244) (.260) (.252) (.265) 
Pseudo R-squared .043 .050 .037 .045 
Number of observations 895 840 857 805 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, 
**, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively. Age under 22 and Age to 
34, none and low education, low income and high goal achievement were used as reference 
categories. a Coefficient estimates.  
 
We also find a significant relationship between goal achievement and self-
disconnection. Note that we have used as a reference category the high level of goal 
achievement. Thus, moving from the high category to the medium one increases the predicted 
probability of self-disconnection by 12.2%, holding all other variables at their means. This 
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emphasizes our next result, that self-control, measured through goal achievement, plays a role 
in self-disconnection. 
 
Result 2. Self-control plays a role in self-disconnection. 
 
Regarding the emergency credit, neither of these variables is statistically significant 
nor the marginal effects are large. This is reasonable since the use of emergency credit is not 
closely related to self-control issues. A household can use the emergency credit because it 
simply forgot to top up, or it may even be the case that the emergency credit is being used as 
a short small “loan” since it involves no interest payment, and hence its use is rational. 
 
Robustness Check. We tested the models using a different definition of the dependent 
variables. We dropped the “neither agree nor disagree” category from the variables self-
disconnection and emergency credit. No sign and/or statistically significant changes 
happened in terms of emergency credit, only in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients. 
Regarding the self-disconnection model, the sign and significance of the main explanatory 
variables did not suffer change, however the significance of the model was reduced, possibly 
due to the lower number of observations. The similarity between the models with the two 
different definitions suggests that our former definition is correct.  
In the estimation of equations (1) and (2) we have assumed that the two dependent 
variables, self-disconnection and emergency credit, are independent and therefore we have 
estimated them separately. Since the respondents that self-disconnect have used the 
emergency credit, one can argue that both equations are related.  If the error terms are 
correlated, then we can gain a more efficient estimator by estimating the two equations 
jointly. As a robustness check, we estimated a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
regression. Table A8 in the Appendix reports estimates of this model with the explanatory 
variables on goal achievement in the equation of self-disconnection but not in the equation of 
emergency credit, and the rest remaining the same. The results are similar to the results 
shown in Table 7, however, it turns out that the two equations are statistically significantly 
correlated but the magnitude of the estimates of the correlation error terms of the equations is 
not so large (rho=0.258). 
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5.2. Worried 
 
Table 8 shows the average marginal effects obtained through the probit estimation of 
equation (3). Interestingly, low goal achievement increases the predicted probability of 
becoming worried about running out of credit. Moving from the high category to the low one 
increases the predicted probability of being worried by 22.7%, holding all other variables at 
their means. This shows signs of awareness among those consumers who feel that they might 
run out of gas. Those consumers who know that they will not self-disconnect have no reason 
to be worried and so represent those consumers that we do not want to target with a 
commitment contract, or even a reminder. Nevertheless, this analysis is not sufficient to 
clearly identify “sophisticated” consumers and “naïve” consumers in our sample especially 
because “naïve” consumers tend to be overconfident and therefore, might have overstated 
their true level of goal achievement.  
 
Table 8. Self-control variables on worried 
Average Marginal Effects, 
Probit 
Dep. Var.: Worried 
Female .101*** 
 (.097) 
Education 
   Medium -.018 
 (.100) 
  Higher -.014 
 (.136) 
Income 
   Medium -.038 
 (.102) 
  High -.035 
    (.135) 
Household adults    -.006 
 (.045) 
Goal Achievement 
   Low .227*** 
 (.178) 
  Medium .077** 
 (.104) 
Constant .268 a ** 
 (.251) 
Pseudo R-squared .04 
Number of observations 878 
Prob > chi2 .00 
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent 
significant levels. Percent correctly predicted: 70.05. Age under 
22 and Age to 34, none and low education, low income and high 
goal achievement were used as reference categories. a Coefficient 
estimates. Age categorical variables are here omitted. 
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5.3. Preferred Saving Plan 
 
Though a significant percentage (around 36%) of consumers have chosen regular payments 
saving plan as their preferred option, as it is shown in Table 6, plenty of comments expressed 
some concern about the lack of flexibility. Thus, we will investigate deeper which type of 
customer chooses each plan. 
Table 9 shows the estimation results for the choice of the preferred saving plan. All 
the saving plans are compared to the “none of the options” choice. We find that a higher age 
reduces the likelihood of choosing a saving plan (with the exception of the summer fixed 
payments plan, which is not statistically significant). Keeping all other variables at their 
means, the predicted probability of choosing a regular payment plan is 1.7% higher for those 
that had already self-disconnected and around 16% higher for those who find PPMs of not 
make it easier to pay. This contrasts with ad-hoc payments since having self-disconnection 
decreases the predicted probability of choosing ad-hoc payments.  
For both plans regular payment and reminder, a higher income leads to a greater 
likelihood of choosing a saving plan instead of none. These results also suggest a relationship 
between self-disconnection and saving plans, which leads to the following result.  
 
Result 3. A household that stated that it had already self-disconnected has a higher 
probability of accepting a commitment device, especially for the contract with summer fixed 
payments.  
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Table 9. Multinomial logit: preferred plan (base comparison: “None of the options”) 
Average Marginal 
Effects, 
Multinomial Logit  
Regular 
payments 
Voluntary 
savings 
Ad-hoc 
payments 
Summer fixed 
payments 
Reminder 
Age           
  45 to 54 -.058  -.013  -.020  .038 ** .008  
 (.044)  (.025)  (.027)  (.014)  (.034)  
  55 to 64 -.073 * .004  -.051 * .006  .053  
 (.050)  (.028)  (.032)  (.020)  (.036)  
  65 over -.144 ** -.068 * -.050 * .039  .093  
 (.079)  (.053)  (.049)  (.019)  (.051)  
Education           
  Medium -.053  .007  -.034 * .006  .030  
 (.040)  (.022)  (.025)  (.010)  (.029)  
  Higher -.092  -.018  -.011  .005  .087  
 (.054)  (.033)  (.034)  (.014)  (.035)  
Income           
  Medium .083 ** -.048  -.015  .002  .045 ** 
 (.040)  (.023)  (.024)  (.011)  (.029)  
  High .094  -.014  -.079  .006  .020  
 (.051)  (.028)  (.037)  (.013)  (.039)  
Self-disconnection .017 * .014  -.007  .019 ** .026 * 
 (.037)  (.021)  (.024)  (.010)  (.027)  
Inconvenience of 
top up 
.164 *** .004 * -.023  -.005  -.018  
 (.038)  (.025)  (.026)  (.010)  (.029)  
Saving Behaviour .009  .004  -.004  .024 ** -.039  
 (.043)  (.025)  (.027)  (.010)  (.033)  
Goal Achievement           
  Low -.073  -.021  .050  .023  .014  
 (.063)  (.038)  (.033)  (.014)  (.045)  
  Medium .008  .019  -.029  .005  .011  
 (.040)  (.022)  (.027)  (.011)  (.029)  
Constant .353 a  -.816 a *** -.184 a  -3.97 a *** -.984 a *** 
 (.291)  (.412)  (.372)  (.815)  (.376)  
Pseudo R-squared .043          
N. obs. 811          
Prob > chi2 0          
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors calculated by the Delta method are in parentheses. ***, **, 
* stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively and the standard errors are in parenthesis. “None of the 
options” is the base outcome. Age under 22, Age to 34 and Age to 44, none and low education, low income and high goal 
achievement were used as reference categories.  a Coefficient estimates. Small-Hsiao test of independence irrelevant 
alternatives assumption (IIA) was computed and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-violation of IIA.  
 
Overall, the above results demonstrate that there is scope to introduce a commitment 
contract. We show that an internal commitment/self-commitment device is not sufficient in 
eliminating self-disconnections. We find that a consumer/household who has already 
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experienced self-disconnection has a greater probability of accepting a commitment contract. 
Although our multinomial logit model did not show a significant importance of our measure 
of self-control as a predictor of the different types of commitment contract and/or reminder, 
we find that self-control has a great importance in predicting self-disconnection.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
Both low-income households and households revealing that they have already suffered from 
self-disconnection deserve special attention. Tables 10 and 11 show the choices made by 
these two groups of households. For both groups, households prefer a regular payment 
throughout the year. Around 89 consumers who had self-disconnected preferred not to have a 
saving plan. One reason for this is that these consumers may be unaware of their self-control 
issues. In fact, 46% (35 out of 89) of the respondents that answered “none of the options” 
have self-disconnected, but also have stated that they usually achieve their goals. This shows 
a certain sign of naiveté. The reminder could help these consumers to be more aware of 
potential self-control issues and/or likely increases in consumption during the winter. 
The other explanation, which may explain it, is a failure to understand the saving 
plan. In fact, 40% (41 out 89) of the respondents that answered “none of the options” have 
self-disconnected and have no or low education levels. This shows us that there is a need to 
explain the different saving plans more clearly and to use less formal educated language so as 
to reach all consumers. A further explanation is that these 89 consumers may face extreme 
financial constraints and the complete lack of spare cash makes a saving plan not possible. In 
fact, 37% (33 out of 89) of the respondents that answered “none of the options” have self-
disconnected and have low income.  
 
Table 10. Cross tabulation: preferred saving plan vs. low-income  
    Preferred saving plan   
    Regular 
payments 
Voluntary 
savings 
Ad-hoc 
payments 
Summer 
fixed 
payments 
Reminder None Total 
Low income 
0 252 43 59 26 96 127 603 
1 142 44 51 14 53 115 419 
Total 394 87 110 40 149 242 1,022 
Notes: Pearson chi2(5) =15.2764 (p = .009).  
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Table 11. Cross tabulation: preferred saving plan vs. self-disconnection 
    Preferred saving plan   
    Regular 
payments 
Voluntary 
savings 
Ad-hoc 
payments 
Summer 
fixed 
payments 
Reminder None Total 
Self-
disconnection 
0 245 54 75 20 95 206 695 
1 178 41 48 20 74 89 450 
Total 423 95 123 40 169 295 1,145 
Notes: Pearson chi2(5) =15.6226 (p = .008). 
 
Overall, consumers are interested in a saving plan and in general they agree that it 
would be a good way to spread the cost of seasonal changes in gas use6. We find that those 
households stating they have already self-disconnected would like to commit to a saving 
plan. When asked specifically about their preferred plan, a significant percentage of the 
consumers have chosen the regular payments saving plan as their preferred option, although 
many respondents commented on the lack of flexibility7. Moreover, consumers understand 
that a commitment contract can help them to control their gas bills but do not fully 
understand the possibility of positive synergies in terms of avoiding temptations to spend on 
things that they do not need. 
Based on our findings, we would propose a commitment contract that shares some of 
the characteristics of the regular payments, while allowing for a greater flexibility. For 
example, the customer can make extra payments when they prefer/can, but at the beginning 
of each summer the energy firm suggests an equal weekly/monthly amount (based on the 
previous year’s consumption) that the customer can meet in order to smooth consumption 
through the year.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we designed different contracts to be offered by an energy firm that involve a 
commitment from the consumer. These contracts differ in terms of flexibility and saving 
target. We proposed also a reminder for consumers who do not wish to commit to a specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Customers were asked to answer in a scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” the following statements about 
their preferred saving plan: “It would be a good way to spread the cost of seasonal changes in gas use.”; “It would help me 
focus on budgeting to cover my gas needs.”; “It sounds too complicated.”; “I’d worry about losing the credit I had saved.”; 
and “It could help me reduce my spending on non-essential purchases.”. 
7 In the survey, customers could leave any comments with regards to the saving plans. The customers showed some concerns 
regards to loss of flexibility, lack of spare cash, possible increases on the gas prices, loss of the interest during the summer, 
likelihood to forget to save, and also mistrust from the profit-maximizing firm.  
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plan that involves savings, either because they do not think that they need it, although some 
of them might actually need it, or because they do not wish to commit to one firm. These 
interventions, under certain conditions, can lead to an increase in consumer surplus. Among 
these conditions are the correct identification of those consumers who need a commitment 
device and the “no introduction of extra switching costs” for the consumer of either changing 
tariff or firm. If overall firm costs also decrease as a result of our proposed mechanism then 
there are compelling reasons to believe that our mechanism can lead to an increase in social 
welfare. Nevertheless, a deeper welfare analysis would need to be undertaken before reaching 
such a conclusion. We plan to implement this in future research.  
It is ambiguous whether an increase of the awareness of self-control issues can have 
an impact on other expenditures other than energy. Further, the empirical part of the study 
has a major limitation: we relied exclusively on a self-reported questionnaire. These 
limitations suggest that future research should experimentally test the effectiveness of a 
commitment contract and feedback/reminder to PPM gas consumers. A follow-up survey 
could then test whether there are any spillover effects of other types of expenditure.  
Our analysis has implications for the policy debate on the role of the prepayment 
smart meter in the context of fuel poverty. This link to poverty emphasizes the importance of 
the present study in providing specific and simple solutions to increase levels of energy 
comfort. The solution proposed in this paper does not demand any costs to the government, 
and, is likely to increase social welfare.  
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9. Appendix 
 
Table A1. List of main variables 
Variable Detailed Description 
Age Age of respondent. Categorical ordered variable. 
Female Dummy for the gender of the respondent, Male if =0 and Female otherwise 
#adults household No. persons with more than 16 years old in the household.  
#children household No. children in the household with less or equal to 16 years old.  
Household size No. people in the household 
Household income Household monthly income, including any benefits. Categorical ordered variable 
   Low 
Dummy variable = 1 if household monthly income is up to £1000, and =0, 
otherwise.  
   Medium = 1 if household monthly income is £1001 to £2000, and =0, otherwise. 
   High = 1 if household monthly income is over £2000, and =0, otherwise. 
Education Education level of the respondent.  
   None 
= 1 if the highest education that the respondent obtained is lower than basic, and 
=0, otherwise. 
   Basic (O-levels) = 1 if the highest degree is basic education, and =0, otherwise. 
   Medium (A-levels and 
vocational/professional education) = 1 if the highest degree is medium education, and =0, otherwise. 
   Higher (Univeristy degree and 
postgraduate) = 1 if the highest degree is higher education, and =0, otherwise. 
Emergency credit (stated) 
To what extent do you agree with the statement: I rarely use the emergency 
credit. Strongly disagree=1, =2, =3, =4, Strongly agree=5. Redefined into 
dummy variable. =1 if 
Self-disconnection (stated) 
To what extent do you agree with the statement: Sometimes the emergency credit 
runs out.  Strongly disagree=1, =2, =3, =4, Strongly agree=5. Redefined into 
dummy variable. =1 if 
Top up all year 
Which of the statements is most applicable to your spend on gas throughout the 
year? = 0 if answered I top up much more on my gas meter over the winter than 
over the summer, =1 if answered I top up roughly the same all year around.  
Saving behaviour 
Thinking about your lifestyle and your gas usage, to what extent do you agree 
with: When I'm using less gas in warmer months I like to add any spare cash to 
my savings. Strongly disagree=1, =2, =3, =4, Strongly agree=5. Redefined into 
dummy variable. =1 if Saving behavior=5 or =4, and =0, otherwise. 
Inconvenience of top up 
To what extent do you agree with the statement regarding the overall opinion 
about the saving plan: Pay As You Go makes it easy to pay for my gas. Strongly 
disagree=1, =2, =3, =4, Strongly agree=5. Redefined into dummy variable. =1 if 
Inconvenience of top up=1 or =2 or =3, and =0 otherwise. 
Preferred Plan (PP) 
Binary Variable. Regular payment throughout the year=1, Voluntary savings 
target=2, Ad-hoc extra payments=3, Summer fixed extra payments=4, Reminder 
on consumption=5 
Worried 
To what extent do you agree with the statement regarding the overall opinion 
about the saving plan: I’d worry about losing the credit I had saved.  Strongly 
disagree=1, =2, =3, =4, Strongly agree=5. Redefined into dummy variable. =1 if 
Worried=5 or =4, and =0 otherwise. 
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Table A2. Cross-tabulation between inconvenience of top up and self-disconnection 
    Self-disconnection 
    0 1 Total 
 
0 616 306 922 
Inconvenience of top up 45.46 22.58 68.04 
 
1 203 230 433 
  
14.98 16.97 31.96 
  Total 819 536 1,355 
    60.44 39.56 100 
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) =48.9422 (p = 0.000).	  
Table A3. Cross-tabulation between top up all year and self-disconnection 
    Self-disconnection 
    0 1 Total 
 
0 732 499 1231 
Top up all year 53.59 36.53 90.12 
 
1 96 39 135 
  
7.03 2.86 9.88 
  Total 828 538 1,366 
    60.61 39.39 100 
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) =6.9132 (p = 0.009). 
Table A4. Cross-tabulation between saving behaviour and self-disconnection 
    Self-disconnection 
    0 1 Total 
 
0 507 316 823 
Saving Behaviour, redefined 46.34% 28.88% 75.23% 
 
1 154 117 271 
  
14.08% 10.69% 24.77% 
  Total 661 433 1094 
    60.42% 39.58% 100% 
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) =1.9457 (p = 0.163). The relation between saving behaviour and  
     self-disconnection is not statistically significance. 
Table A5. Cross-tabulation between spare cash and low-income 
    Low income 
    0 1 Total 
 
0 312 258 570 
Spare cash, redefined 25.68% 21.23% 46.91% 
 
1 400 245 645 
  
32.92% 20.16% 53.09% 
  Total 712 503 1215 
    58.6% 41.4% 100% 
Notes: Pearson chi2(1) =6.6079 (p = 0.010). 
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Sample of question on saving plan choice 
 
The following questions relate to how the payment plan may work and we are looking for your 
thoughts on what would be the most beneficial / easy to use. 
Before entering onto the payment plan, you would need to agree to a tailored quote detailing your 
consumption patterns and spend over the year - this would help you understand how you might 
manage the cost of your gas with different saving options that suit your lifestyle and income. Some of 
these options have been listed below and we’d like to know how these sound to you. 
 
The following options are variants of the savings plan. We’d like to know how these saving plans A 
to E appeal to you. Please rate 1 - 5 where 1 is not appealing and 5 is extremely appealing 
  1 2 3 4 5 Don’t know 
 
A. Regular payments throughout year 
Based on the summary of your previous year’s consumption, you agree to an equal weekly / 
monthly amount that you commit to paying through the year. Regular equal payments would 
cover your consumption throughout the year.             
B. Voluntary Savings Target 
You chose a target amount that you feel comfortable / confident in saving. You’re responsible 
for meeting this target and it would be up to you whether or not you achieved your target each 
month. The credit you saved would be used to offset your winter consumption. 
 
C. Ad-hoc Extra Payments 
You make additional payments as and when you can afford to do so. You would not have to 
nominate a target for your savings but the more you saved, the more of your winter 
consumption would be offset. 
 
D. Summer Fixed Extra Payments 
You commit to additional fixed payments just during summer months.  These additional 
payments would be calculated on the basis of your winter time gas consumption in the 
previous year. The extra payments would be used to cover your higher gas payments in the 
wintertime. 
 
E. Feedback on Consumption 
Without changing your monthly payment plan, you receive regular feedback in the summer 
about your average gas payments. For example: ”Last year you spent £20 on gas between July 
and September and you spent £120 on gas between October and December”.  
 
From the options listed in the question above which savings plan would you prefer? Choose one 
option only: 
 
A. Regular payments throughout year 
B. Voluntary Savings Target 
C. Ad-hoc Extra Payments 
D. Summer Fixed Extra Payments 
E. Feedback on Consumption 
None of the above 
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Sample of question on goal achievement 
 
For the savings plan you selected in the question above, do you agree with the following statements? 
Please rate from 1 to 5, where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 5 is Strongly Agree. 
 
I am interested       
It would give me more control over my spend on gas      
It would be a good reminder to save for my future spend on gas     
It would stop me spending too much on things I don’t need      
It sounds complicated 
	   	   	   	   	  
 
Table A6. Distribution of goal achievement questions 
Answer Freq. 
Percent 
over all 
variables 
Percent 
over 
groups 
Goal achievement 
High       
I usually achieve my goals 409 35.2 58.8 
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve and I 
usually achieve my goals 287 24.7 41.2 
Total 696 59.9 100.0 
Medium 
   I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve 184 15.8 52.9 
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization 31 2.7 8.9 
I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking 68 5.9 19.5 
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve and I have 
difficulties in completing a task that requires organization 7 0.6 2.0 
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve and I 
usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking 21 1.8 6.0 
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization and I 
usually achieve my goals 5 0.4 1.4 
I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking and I usually 
achieve my goals 32 2.8 9.2 
Total 348 30 100.0 
Low       
I don't usually achieve my goals 34 2.9 29.1 
I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve and I don't 
usually achieve my goals 17 1.5 14.5 
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization and I 
don't usually achieve my goals 17 1.5 14.5 
I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization and I 
usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking 27 2.3 23.1 
I don't usually achieve my goals and I usually avoid or delay a task that 
requires a lot of thinking 18 1.6 15.4 
I don't usually achieve my goals and I usually achieve my goals 4 0.3 3.4 
Total 117 10.1 100.0 
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Table A7. Medium Goal Achievement: mean characteristics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female 348 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Age      
  21 and Under 348 0.00 0.05 0 1 
  22 to 34 348 0.29 0.45 0 1 
  35 to 44 348 0.24 0.43 0 1 
  45 to 54 348 0.39 0.49 0 1 
  55 to 64 348 0.22 0.42 0 1 
  65 and Over 348 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Top-up all year 348 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Income 
  Low 287 0.45 0.50 0 1 
  Medium 290 0.40 0.49 0 1 
  High 290 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Education 
  None 321 0.12 0.32 0 1 
  Basic 321 0.38 0.49 0 1 
  Medium 321 0.36 0.48 0 1 
  High 321 0.15 0.35 0 1 
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Table A8. Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit 
Seemingly Unrelated 
Bivariate Probit 
Dep. Var.: Emergency 
credit 
Dep. Var.:  
Self-disconnection 
Age 
    35 to 44  .152 -.248 
 (.234) (.229) 
  45 to 54 .077 -.207 
 (.224) (.220) 
  55 to 64 -.007 -.214 
 (.234) (.230) 
  Over 65 -.256 -.452* 
 (.270) (.274) 
Female -.003 .022 
 (.102) (.102) 
Education 
    Medium .136 .055 
 (.103) (.103) 
  Higher .055 .017 
 (.141) (.139) 
Income 
    Medium .324*** -.003 
 (.105) (.104) 
  High .162 -.076 
 (.136) (.138) 
Household adults  .080* .069 
 (.047) (.046) 
Saving behavior -.343*** .027 
 (.110) (.111) 
Top up all year -.490*** -.441*** 
 (.156) (.170) 
Inconvenience of top up .042 .398*** 
 (.103) (.100) 
Goal Achievement   
  Low  .265* 
  (.154) 
  Medium  .288*** 
  (.103) 
Constant .038a -.413a 
 (.264) (.266) 
Rho .258  
 (.058) 
Likelihood-ratio test of 
rho=0; Prob > chi2 0  
Wald chi2(28) 82.12  
Prob>chi2 0  
Number of observations 787  
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively. Age 
under 22 and Age to 34, none and low education, low income and high goal 
achievement were used as reference categories. 
 
 
